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DEFERENCE IN IMMIGRATION NATIONAL
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ABSTRACT
When confronted with cases lying at the intersection of immigration
and national security, the judiciary has abided by a consistent principle:
the president knows best. Since the late nineteenth century, rather than
deciding these cases on the merits, courts have instead deferred to the
executive branch. Courts’ reluctance to engage in judicial review of
these policies is based on the traditions of special national security
deference and the plenary power doctrine. Deference of this kind is not
without its proponents, who cite the executive branch’s vast institutional
advantages in the realms of immigration and national security.
Detractors, on the other hand, contend that this deference renders the
president beyond judicial review, creating a blank check for the
executive branch to take questionable acts in immigration matters with
little to no scrutiny by the legislative or judicial branches. After the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a challenge to President
Trump’s controversial travel ban case in Trump v. Hawaii, both sides
saw it as an opportunity to either preserve or jettison deference to the
executive branch in this area.
But with a narrow 5–4 holding, neither side could claim victory.
Instead, the future of plenary power remains an open question. To fill
the gap, this Note proposes practical safeguards for the judiciary to act
as a counterweight to unchecked executive authority in the realm of
immigration law.
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“Maybe it’s the instinct of every immigrant, born of
necessity or of longing: Someplace else will be better than
here. And the condition: if only I can get to that place.”
–Cristina Henríquez1
INTRODUCTION
In 1948, Jewish refugee Ellen Knauff arrived in New York Harbor,
brimming with hope and eager for a new beginning in the United
States.2 After leaving her native Germany for Czechoslovakia during
the Hitler regime, Ellen escaped to England as a refugee.3 There, she
worked for the Royal Air Force through the German surrender; after
the war, she returned to Germany to work with the U.S. War
Department, earning multiple commendations along the way.4 While
living in Frankfurt, she met and married her husband, Kurt Knauff, an
American citizen and decorated veteran of World War II.5 As peace
and stability slowly crept back across the globe, Ellen and her husband
made arrangements to end their journey in the United States.6
However, upon her arrival, she was confronted with an
unexpected hitch. An immigration official—equipped with nothing
more than suspicions of Ellen’s intentions in the United States—
stopped her.7 Those suspicions were enough to detain Ellen at Ellis
Island without a hearing, access to legal resources, or visitation
privileges.8 Finally, after months of uncertainty, immigration officials
decided to permanently exclude her from the country because of
concerns—later proven to be unfounded—that Ellen was a Communist
spy.9 In denying her entry, the government “refused her request for a
hearing, and refused to provide evidence of its charges to anyone,”

1. CRISTINA HENRÍQUEZ, THE BOOK OF UNKNOWN AMERICANS 286 (2014).
2. Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban and Presidential Power, LAWFARE (Apr. 23, 2018, 8:00
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-and-presidential-power [https://perma.cc/4FMTXVFQ].
3. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 539 (1950) (“[Knauff] left
Germany and went to Czechoslovakia during the Hitler regime.”); Margulies, supra note 2
(“Ellen Knauff was a refugee of the second world war from Czechoslovakia . . . .”).
4. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539; Margulies, supra note 2.
5. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539.
6. See id. (“On August 14, 1948, [Knauff] sought to enter the United States to be
naturalized.”).
7. Id. at 539–40; Margulies, supra note 2.
8. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539; Margulies, supra note 2.
9. Margulies, supra note 2.
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simply noting her admission would be “prejudicial to the interests of
the United States.”10
Ellen’s story triggered headlines and scrutiny from layperson and
policymaker alike.11 After a public outcry, the Supreme Court agreed
to take up her case in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.12 At
issue was whether the United States could justifiably exclude “the alien
wife of a citizen who had served honorably in the armed forces”
without a hearing.13
In a contentious decision, the Supreme Court upheld Ellen’s
exclusion.14 Although her challenge against the government revolved
around the undisclosed security reasons behind her detention,15 the
Court refused to inquire into the government’s evidence for excluding
Ellen.16 Instead, the Court reasoned that as an exercise of the
government’s power as a sovereign and over the foreign affairs of
United States, “the decision to admit or to exclude an alien may be
lawfully placed with the President,” and that “such authority is final
and conclusive.”17 In a holding reflecting immense deference to the
executive branch, the Court declared “it is not within the province of
any court . . . to review the determination of the political branch of the
Government to exclude a given alien.”18
The Knauff decision was hardly a popular one.19 Nevertheless, it
was—and still is—consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence. When
confronted with controversial national security questions, the judiciary
has typically deferred to the executive branch based on the longstanding tradition of special national security deference.20 This

10. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539–40.
11. Louis Fisher, To Have and To Hold: Those in U.S. Custody Deserve Reliable Evidence,
LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 16, 2009), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/knauff.2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PNL4-AJF5].
12. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
13. Id. at 539.
14. Id. at 547.
15. Id. at 540.
16. See id. at 543 (“[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government to exclude a given
alien.”).
17. Id.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See Fisher, supra note 11 (detailing the public scrutiny of the decision).
20. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (“We hold that when the
Executive exercises this power . . . the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification . . . .”); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
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tradition is grounded in the belief that the executive branch is better
equipped to make relevant judgments on national security issues
because it has access to more resources and expertise on these
complicated matters.21
However, cases like Ellen Knauff’s have troubled observers over
the last century and a half—cases that lie at the cross-section between
immigration and national security. In those cases, deference to the
executive is understood as a natural outgrowth of the government’s
plenary power over immigration matters. This “plenary power
doctrine” contends only the political branches of government—
Congress and the president—have control over immigration policy.22
Since the late nineteenth century, the judicial branch has employed this
“constitutional oddity”23 to refuse to review immigration cases it
believes bears on the security of the nation. Even in the modern era,
federal courts have invoked the plenary power doctrine to retreat from
the immigration debate that looms so large over the nation’s
conscience, with some “suggest[ing] that the [doctrine] precludes any
judicial scrutiny of immigration decisions affecting arriving
immigrants.”24 However, in doing so, courts often decline to hear the
merits of Equal Protection, Due Process, and First Amendment claims
that would be entertained in nonimmigration cases25—meaning that
fundamental constitutional protections are being eclipsed by the
judiciary’s deference to the executive branch.26
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210–11 (1953) (upholding on national security grounds the executive
branch’s exclusion of an Eastern European resident who left the United States to visit his mother).
21. See Eric A. Posner, Deference to the Executive in the United States After September 11:
Congress, the Courts, and the Office of Legal Counsel, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 216 (2012)
(noting that deference to the executive branch on national security issues “rests on basic intuitions
about institutional competence: that the executive can act more decisively and with greater
secrecy than Congress or the courts because it is a hierarchical body and commands forces that
are trained and experienced in countering security threats”).
22. Id.
23. Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive: National Security and the Limits of
Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 732 (2017).
24. Adam B. Cox, Deference, Delegation, and Immigration Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1671,
1671 (2007).
25. Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV.
77, 83 (2017) (“[F]rom the late nineteenth century through the Cold War, the Supreme Court
routinely sustained government decisions that would plainly violate constitutional rights had they
occurred outside of the immigration context, reasoning that the political branches possess
‘plenary power’ to exclude, deport, and detain noncitizens without judicial restraint.”).
26. Natsu Taylor Saito makes a similar argument in the international human rights context:
[U]nder the guise of the plenary power doctrine, the courts not only refuse to apply the
basic protections “guaranteed” by the Constitution, but they also refuse to apply
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Though discussion over the plenary power doctrine has been
robust, this debate has “reached a stalemate.”27 Proponents of the
doctrine point to the vast institutional advantages of the political
branches as the reason why “immigration’s plenary power doctrine
endures.”28 Yet its detractors remain concerned that unchecked
government actions on immigration, such as the Chinese Exclusion
Act, are merely smokescreens for “expressions of broader xenophobic
sentiments.”29 Critics also note that ever since the passage of the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress has steadily
taken a backseat to the president in immigration policymaking.30 As a
result, some fear that this doctrine has created a blank check for the
executive branch to take questionable acts in immigration matters with
little to no scrutiny by the legislative or judicial branches.31
However, this scholarly stalemate was poised to be broken when
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Trump v. Hawaii,32 the
controversial case challenging President Trump’s travel ban on seven
countries, five of which had Muslim-majority populations.33 For many
commentators, the case promised either to spell the doctrine’s end or
to cement its longevity for years to come.34

international law, leaving the basic rights of immigrants, American Indians, residents
of U.S. “territories,” and other sectors of the American population essentially
unprotected by anything except the goodwill of Congress.
Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights in the Name of
Sovereignty, 51 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 1115, 1121–22 (2002).
27. Ashley S. Deeks, The Observer Effect: National Security Litigation, Executive Policy
Changes, and Judicial Deference, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 827 (2013).
28. David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L.
REV. 29, 29 (2015).
29. Jonathan Hafetz, Immigration and National Security Law: Converging Approaches to
State Power, Individual Rights, and Judicial Review, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 625, 628 (2012).
30. Fields, supra note 23, at 731–32.
31. Id. at 732.
32. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
33. Id. at 2405, 2421.
34. Compare Fields, supra note 23, at 732 (“But there is something uniquely different about
these executive orders: unlike all other immigration policies enacted since the plenary power
doctrine was established in 1889, these orders appear likely to be struck down as
unconstitutional.”), with Hans A. von Spakovsky, Why Trump’s Immigration Order Is Legal and
FOUND.
(Mar.
20,
2017),
Constitutional,
HERITAGE
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/why-trumps-immigration-order-legal-andconstitutional [https://perma.cc/T9XV-HFBF] (“When this executive order finally gets to the
Supreme Court, the justices could do no better than adopting [the plenary power doctrine] in
whole when they overrule these improper, erroneous, and plainly wrong court decisions that have
obstructed the president’s ability to protect our country.”).
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Although neither camp claimed a clear victory, the Supreme
Court decided to uphold President Trump’s travel ban. In a majority
opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court affirmed the
president’s authority to exclude individuals from these seven nations
for national security reasons, noting the broad statutory conferral of
power to the president on matters of immigration.35 In dissent, Justice
Sotomayor condemned the majority’s acceptance of a policy that
“masquerades behind a facade of national-security concerns” without
delving into an inquiry of the government’s underlying motives.36 The
legal community was similarly divided: some celebrated that “[t]he
Supreme Court wasn’t willing to substitute its own judgment on
national security issues for that of the president,”37 while others took
umbrage with the majority’s thin legal reasoning38 and “oppos[ed] the
court’s ruling on personal and moral grounds.”39
Though hotly contested, President Trump’s travel ban—in reality,
a series of executive orders—was not without precedent. In the last six
decades, multiple presidents on both sides of the aisle have issued
immigration restrictions under the broad authority granted to them by
Congress. For example, President Carter issued an executive order
during the Iran hostage crisis effectively limiting the entry of Iranian
nationals;40 President Reagan blocked the entry of foreigners who had
contracted HIV;41 and President Obama “dramatically slowed the
processing of refugee requests” from Iraq after two Iraqi refugees were
35. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
36. Id. at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
37. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Supreme Court Trump Travel Ban Decision Is an Important
28,
2018),
Victory for
Our National
Security,
HERITAGE FOUND. (June
https://www.heritage.org/immigration/commentary/supreme-court-trump-travel-ban-decisionimportant-victory-our-national [https://perma.cc/3B8R-DJJX].
38. See, e.g., Anthony D. Romero, The Supreme Court Failed Us, ACLU (June 27, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/supreme-court-failed-us [https://perma.cc/L2J2UY7T] (“The five justices ruling in the majority performed a routine of judicial acrobatics to
construct a legal argument sanctioning religious discrimination.”); Shirin Sinnar, Trump v.
Hawaii: A Roadmap for New Racial Origin Quotas, STAN. L. SCH. BLOGS (June 26, 2018),
https://law.stanford.edu/2018/06/26/trump-v-hawaii-a-roadmap-for-new-racial-origin-quotas
[https://perma.cc/JVH3-4B9P] (arguing that the Court’s decision was incorrect because “the
travel ban violated a non-discrimination provision of the immigration law”).
39. Shadi Hamid, The Travel Ban, the Law, and What’s “Right,” BROOKINGS (June 28, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-travel-ban-the-law-and-whats-right [https://perma.cc/
JH75-W45U].
40. Exec. Order No. 12,172, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,947 (Nov. 26, 1979).
41. Steve Connor, US Lifts Ban on Foreigners with HIV Imposed by Reagan, INDEPENDENT
(Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-lifts-ban-on-foreignerswith-hiv-imposed-by-reagan-1857769.html [https://perma.cc/MX2A-2VEQ].
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suspected of making bombs while living in Kentucky as refugees.42
Nevertheless, in comparison to his predecessors, President Trump’s
ban is far broader and lacks the immediately pressing national security
justification of previous executive orders.43 Thus, although the
executive’s exercise of plenary immigration power may be nothing
new, the breadth of this power is increasing.
This Note proposes a limit on this mushrooming and largely
unchecked authority by imposing practical judicial and legislative
safeguards. To be clear, this Note does not suggest that the plenary
power doctrine should be abandoned in its entirety;44 rather, this Note
attempts to reconcile the divergent perspectives on the plenary power
doctrine by proposing a mechanism for meaningful judicial oversight
that maintains respect for the president’s expertise on national security
matters. Congress could certainly act to substantively curtail the
president’s authority in the immigration arena, but bipartisan
immigration legislation seems particularly elusive in the current
political climate. For that reason, this Note focuses on practical
mechanisms for courts to act as a counterweight to unchecked
executive authority in the realm of immigration law.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on
the evolution of the plenary power doctrine from the Chinese

42. Michelle Mark, There are Major Differences Between Trump’s Immigration Ban and
Obama’s 2011 Policy, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 1, 2017, 8:24 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bigdifferences-between-trumps-immigration-ban-obamas-2011-policy-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/
KY5B-KMYV].
43. See Ann M. Simmons & Alan Zarembo, Other Presidents Have Blocked Groups of
Foreigners from the U.S., But Never So Broadly, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigrant-ban-history-20170130-story.html
[https://perma.cc/2Q48-8V2U] (“What is clear is that Trump’s use of the law goes far beyond that
of any past president.”).
44. For examples of this approach, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) (“[M]y conclusion
is that the Court should abandon the special deference it has accorded Congress in the field of
immigration.”); Cornelia T. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary
Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 4 (1998) (arguing that “the courts lack adequate justifications for the plenary power doctrine”);
Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002)
(describing the plenary power doctrine as “long decried among rights advocates and within the
academy”). In his article, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, Professor David
A. Martin wryly commented: “It almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars
embarking on the study of immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or
related doctrines of deference.” Martin, supra note 28, at 30. But ironically, by his own admission,
Martin’s hands are not clean either: thirty-two years prior, he published his own plenary power
rite-of-passage piece as a young scholar. Id. at n.3.
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Exclusion Act to Trump v. Hawaii. Part II highlights modern problems
with the doctrine. Finally, Part III suggests two practical safeguards to
limit unchecked executive power. First, the courts should impose an
articulation requirement on any immigration-policy directives taken by
the president that invoke national security concerns to trigger judicial
deference. Second, Congress should designate one circuit to hear
challenges to executive policies on immigration.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although Trump v. Hawaii inspired a wealth of scholarly debate,
most of the foundational precedent discussed in the leadup to the
decision dates back to the late nineteenth century. This Part stretches
back to those early days to chronicle how responsibility for
immigration slowly concentrated in the executive branch over the
centuries. Section A explores the roots of the plenary power doctrine
with a focus on the Chinese Exclusion Act. Section B examines the
development of judicial and legislative deference to the executive
branch during World War II. Finally, Section C links these historical
lessons with the recent Trump v. Hawaii decision.
A. The Chinese Exclusion Act and the Birth of Immigration Plenary
Power
In the early 1850s, the American west coast witnessed its first
surge of non-European immigrants. Galvanized by California’s
booming gold rush and increasingly amicable relations between China
and the United States,45 Chinese immigrants headed to America to
make their fortunes working in gold mines.46 Soon afterward, Chinese
immigrants were working as laborers across a variety of industries,
from agriculture and garment production to railroad construction.47

45. In order to accommodate the influx of Chinese immigrants, China and the United States
signed the Burlingame-Seward Treaty of 1868, which, among other things, granted privileges to
U.S. and Chinese citizens traveling between the two countries. For an in-depth chronology of
diplomacy and treaty arrangements between the United States and China during this period, see
generally Mark A. Ryan, Legal and Diplomatic Aspects of Chinese Immigration to the United
States, 1868–1894, 3 CHINESE (TAIWAN) Y.B. INT’L L. & AFF. 22 (1983).
46. Chinese Immigration and the Chinese Exclusion Act, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ARCHIVES
(2001), https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/gp/82014.htm [https://perma.cc/X2S8-3U7C].
47. See id. (noting that Chinese immigrants worked in these industries for lower wages due
to their need to send money home, outstanding loans from securing passage to America, and
weaker political bargaining power).
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Unfortunately, the more entrenched Chinese immigrants became
in American society, the more other working-class Americans began
to resent their presence. Politicians seized upon this animus to recast
Chinese immigrants as scapegoats for the nation’s monetary woes,
“pointing the finger at Chinese immigrants for economic hardship and
labeling them fundamentally incapable of assimilation.”48 Eventually
words turned to violence: during the 1870s and early 1880s, 153 antiChinese riots erupted throughout the United States49 where “Chinese
communities were harassed, attacked, or expelled.”50
In the wake of this civil unrest, the onus was on Congress to
respond. After a series of debates, Congress passed the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882, making the Chinese “the first nationality to be
singled out for restriction of immigration.”51 Often obscured in the
historical consciousness of the United States, the Chinese Exclusion
Act composed a rather dark chapter of American history. Even though
the modern perception of the Act is overwhelmingly negative,52 the
anti-immigrant sentiments in the late nineteenth century that
motivated this kind of legislation were popular among the common
man and elite members of society alike.53 Moreover, this time period

48. Braden Goyette, How Racism Created America’s Chinatowns, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
11, 2014, 7:35 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/11/american-chinatowns-history_n_
6090692.html [https://perma.cc/L346-58NK]. Several American politicians, like Senator James A.
Blaine, were responsible for fanning the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment with their rabblerousing rhetoric. See ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 3 (1998) (noting that Senator Blaine “declared on the Senate floor:
‘We have this day to choose . . . whether our legislation shall be in the interest of the American
free laborer or for the servile laborer from China’”).
49. Mark R. Ellis, Denver’s Anti-Chinese Riot, ENCYCLOPEDIA GREAT PLAINS (2011),
http://plainshumanities.unl.edu/encyclopedia/doc/egp.asam.011 [https://perma.cc/JBY5-J2BR].
50. Robert C. Kennedy, Justice for the Chinese, N.Y. TIMES LEARNING NETWORK (2001),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/0327.html
[https://perma.cc/F8JA-KH9W].
51. Ryan, supra note 45, at 22–23.
52. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime
Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1833 (2007) (arguing that the Chae Chan
Ping Court “disguised its rationale,” hiding the race-based grounds that “clearly motivated the
law”); Hafetz, supra note 29, at 628 (acknowledging that “racist attitudes towards the Chinese
helped spark passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act and laid the groundwork for other racially
motivated laws that followed”).
53. See Kat Chow, As Chinese Exclusion Act Turns 135, Experts Point to Parallels Today,
NPR (May 5, 2017, 6:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/05/527091890/the135-year-bridge-between-the-chinese-exclusion-act-and-a-proposed-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/
3CC3-H68T] (“[A]nti-immigrant measures in the 1880s . . . were driven by both working class
people and elites.”).
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“set the groundwork for immigrant detention centers and the country’s
first large-scale deportation of a single immigrant group.”54
Among other things, the Act suspended the entry of Chinese
laborers into the United States for the next ten years.55 In 1884,
Congress created an exception for Chinese workers who wanted to
leave the United States temporarily, but it required them to carry a
certificate of reentry.56 In 1887, a Chinese laborer named Chae Chan
Ping received one of these certificates and left the United States only
to return after one year.57 On October 8, 1888, Chae Chan Ping arrived
in San Francisco on a steamship after a one-month-long journey from
Hong Kong.58 But unbeknownst to him, the law had changed: on
October 1, 1888—seven days prior to his arrival—Congress passed an
act to deny all Chinese reentry to the United States.59 After the
collector of the port refused to honor his certificate, Chae Chan Ping
was detained aboard the steamer by the ship captain.60 A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus was filed on his behalf in Northern District of
California but was denied.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Chae Chan Ping’s
appeal in 1889, where it heard arguments in Chae Chan Ping v. United
States62 alleging that Congress’s suspension of Chinese reentry violated
treaties signed by China and the United States.63 After determining
that Congress did not violate these treaties,64 Justice Stephen J. Field,
writing for the majority, noted that Congress was motivated by the
perception that “Chinese laborers had a baneful effect upon
the . . . interests of the State . . . upon public morals . . . and [were] a
54. Id.
55. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58–59.
56. Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN AM. L.J. 13, 15 (2003).
57. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
63. Id. at 600.
64. Id. The Court spent a significant amount of time addressing the history of the
Burlingame-Sewell Treaty and the development of laws excluding Chinese laborers. Id. at 590–
95. While it acknowledged that the 1888 Act did in fact violate the terms of the treaty, the Court
held that this did not invalidate Congress’s action as “[t]he treaties were of no greater legal
obligation than the act of Congress.” Id. at 600. Accordingly, it ruled that because Congress’s act
was the most recent, it superseded the Burlingame-Seward treaty. Id. (“[T]he last expression of
the sovereign will must control.”).
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menace to our civilization.”65 Despite this pronouncement of animus,
Justice Field noted “[t]his court is not a censor of the morals of other
departments of the government; it is not invested with any authority to
pass judgment upon the motives of their conduct.”66
The decision in Chae Chan Ping was the first time that the Court
articulated the immigration plenary power doctrine.67 Specifically,
Justice Field noted that if Congress “considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate
with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security,” then that
“determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”68 Based on the
deference analysis, the Court held that the decisions to restrict
immigration for the security of the nation rest solely with the
government and “are not questions for judicial determination.”69 Thus,
the roots of the plenary power doctrine were prudential, not
constitutional. Even though the Constitution itself designates the
legislature as having the power “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization,”70 it grants neither the executive nor the legislative
branch absolute power to make decisions on immigration.71 The basis
for the Court’s reasoning in Chae Chan Ping, therefore, relied on the
idea that the ability to exclude immigrants is “an incident of
sovereignty”72—in other words, the U.S. government has an absolute
right to regulate its borders because of its unique powers as an
independent nation, notwithstanding its enumerated powers under the
Constitution.73 The Court’s decision is also based on practical
65. Id. at 595.
66. Id. at 602–03.
67. See Martin, supra note 28, at 30 (“Chae Chan Ping v. United States . . . is traditionally
taken as the fountainhead of the plenary power doctrine.”).
68. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
69. Id. at 609.
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. In contrast to the broader immigration processes that govern
entry to the United States, naturalization deals with the power of the government to grant
immigrants citizenship after they are already in the United States.
71. Id.; see also Fields, supra note 23, at 752 (noting that immigration authority has been seen
as “emanating from inherent national sovereignty rather than from the Constitution”); Martin,
supra note 28, at 31 (“[The Court] used the concept to establish, through structural reasoning,
that the federal government in fact does possess the authority to regulate migration, even though
such a power is not enumerated in the Constitution.”).
72. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
73. Professor Sarah Cleveland discusses this notion in her article, stating:
[Justice Field] characterized the immigration power as an exclusive federal power
incident to sovereignty, derived from the absolute sovereign right of all nations to deny
aliens entry. The power was presumed to be incorporated in the general powers of the
national government over foreign affairs and was not subject to judicial review.
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considerations. Namely, as a matter of aptitude, it is necessary for the
political branches of government—who are “alone competent to act
upon the subject”—to retain total control over immigration issues.74
As part of its decision, the Court also adopted a rather broad
interpretation of national security. Although the Court acknowledged
that the country was not at war during this period—which would act as
the most natural trigger for this kind of deference—it pointed out that
relevant national security threats remained—namely, the riots and civil
unrest stemming from rampant anti-Chinese sentiment.75 Stated
differently, it was not the actions of the Chinese immigrants themselves
that was the problem but rather the reaction by other Americans who
did not approve of their presence. The result is a standard for national
security that relies heavily on the political branches of government to
define the national security concern itself, which can be as broad as
necessary.
B. World War II, Statutory Developments, and the “Unreviewable
Executive”
Although the Chae Chan Ping decision initially left plenary power
over immigration to both Congress and the president, that power was
gradually ceded to the executive branch during the twentieth century.
Today, almost all immigration reform comes out of the White House;
Congress has not passed meaningful immigration legislation since the
Reagan administration.76 This Section explores the origins and
evolution of this shift, starting with the Second World War.
Even before the horrors of the Holocaust manifested in full, the
anti-Semitism spreading throughout Europe during the early 1930s had
generated a substantial Jewish refugee crisis.77 This animus was
especially pronounced in Germany, where unrelenting attacks on
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 133 (2002).
For a thorough examination of the history of the “powers inherent in sovereignty” theory, see
generally id.
74. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
75. Id. at 603–05.
76. See Fields, supra note 23, at 731–32 (“In the three decades since President Reagan’s
executive immigration orders and the accompanying Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, not a single major immigration measure has passed in Congress.”).
HIST.
&
OURSELVES,
77. See
America
and
the
Holocaust,
FACING
https://www.facinghistory.org/defying-nazis/america-and-holocaust
[https://perma.cc/2WYD6U35] (stating that in “1938, delegates from 32 nations met . . . to discuss how to respond to the
[Jewish] refugee crisis” caused by the German government’s human rights violations).
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Jewish quality of life, including restricted access to housing, financial
assets, and the freedom of movement, spurred Jewish citizens to flee
the country.78 As German annexation and occupation efforts expanded
across the continent, the crisis only intensified.79
But the political climate of the United States in 1939 was anything
but welcoming. Not only was the country gearing up for potential
global conflict, but it had also been suffering from the effects of the
Great Depression for the past decade.80 This economic woe combined
with nationalist sentiment to produce predictable results: a 1939 publicopinion poll found that “83% of Americans were opposed to the
admission of refugees.”81
The hostility toward refugees during this period punctuated the
expansion of plenary power doctrine. In Shanughssey v. United States
ex rel. Mezei,82 the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of an Eastern
European man who, after residing in the United States from 1923 to
1948, visited his sick mother in Hungary and unsuccessfully attempted
to return to the United States afterwards.83 Citing Chae Chan Ping and
Knauff, the Court held that “the Attorney General, acting for the
President, may shut out aliens whose ‘entry would be prejudicial to the
interest of the United States . . . without a hearing.’”84
At the same time as the Court was expanding the plenary power
doctrine, Congress was busy delegating a great deal of its immigration
authority to the executive branch. This power shift accelerated with the
passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”).85 The
INA, as amended, accomplishes this shift in two primary ways. First,
federal agencies under the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) are responsible for enforcing immigration law and policy

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Interestingly, Congress did admit some refugees—just not Jewish refugees. Although
the legislative and executive branches rushed to pass bills allowing English children to enter the
United States, similar actions to allow twenty-thousand Jewish children to enter were summarily
rejected. Rafael Medoff, Opinion, During World War II, America Welcomed British Children. Not
POST
(Mar.
23,
2018,
6:24
PM),
Jewish
Ones,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/during-world-war-ii-america-welcomed-british-childrennot-jewish-ones/2018/03/23/fac1df64-2dd8-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html [https://perma.cc/
L93E-9SL3].
82. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
83. Id. at 211–12.
84. Id. at 211.
85. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
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under the INA, including U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.86 Second, the INA codifies the governing principle of the
plenary power doctrine by broadly conferring the power to take
exclusionary immigration actions to the president:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any
class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such
period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or
any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the
entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.87

This section of the INA does not include any explicit conditions or
qualifications; instead, it embeds the principles of plenary power deep
in the fabric of the president’s statutory authority.
The effective result of these judicial and legislative developments
was to give the executive branch control of most immigration-policy
decisions. For example, Congress delegates the power “to set
immigration screening policy” to the executive “by making a huge
fraction of noncitizens deportable” at the president’s discretion.88 But
because the population of deportable noncitizen immigrants has
swelled over the last several years, this “functionally gives the
President the power to exert control over the number and types of
immigrants inside the United States.”89 These delegations have created
what Professor Shawn Fields calls “the Unreviewable Executive”: an
executive whose immigration determinations are entirely unchecked
by either Congress or the judiciary.90 Even though the Court in Chae
Chan Ping found that both the executive and legislative branches have
power over such determinations, “not a single major immigration
measure has passed in Congress” after the Immigration Reform and

86. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45020, A PRIMER ON U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45020.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PE2V-LMVV].
87. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(f), 66 Stat. 163, 188
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
88. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 463 (2009).
89. Id.
90. Fields, supra note 23, at 731.
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Control Act of 1986.91 Rather, most movement in immigration law—
like the Trump travel ban—has been made by executive order.92
C. Trump v. Hawaii and the Tepid Reassurance of the Plenary Power
Doctrine
Shortly after being elected president, Donald Trump fulfilled one
of his most vocal—and controversial—campaign promises: a wholesale
immigration ban on individuals from countries deemed a possible
terrorist threat.93 On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed
Executive Order No. 13,769,94 which suspended the entry of foreign
nationals hailing from countries Congress or the president had
designated as terrorist threats for ninety days.95 In this initial executive
order, President Trump blocked citizens of seven Muslim-majority
countries from entering the country: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen.96
The next day, a number of individuals were halted from entering
the United States at various airports around the country, leading the
American Civil Liberties Union to file an emergency appeal with a
federal court in Brooklyn challenging the executive order.97 The court
sided with the plaintiffs, issuing a temporary stay “ordering that
refugees and others detained at airports across the United States not
be sent back to their home countries.”98 Instead of appealing the
district court’s decision, President Trump signed Executive Order No.

91. Id. at 731–32.
92. Id. at 732.
93. See Carol Morello, Trump Signs Order Temporarily Halting Admission of Refugees,
Promises
Priority
for
Christians,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
27,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-approves-extreme-vetting-ofrefugees-promises-priority-for-christians/2017/01/27/007021a2-e4c7-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_
story.html [https://perma.cc/LEQ5-DHK6].
94. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
95. Id. Among other things, this executive order also halted the entry of all refugees for 120
days. Id.
96. Liam Stack, Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration: What We Know and What We
Don’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/trump-refugee-banmuslim-executive-order.html [https://perma.cc/DY48-P79T].
97. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); see also Christopher Mele, Judge
Who Blocked Trump’s Refugee Order Praised for ‘Firm Moral Compass,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/judge-trump-refugee-order-ann-donnelly.html
[https://perma.cc/N6QM-DAXH].
98. Mele, supra note 97.
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13,780.99 Intended to be less controversial, this updated version of the
travel ban both delayed the date when the new restrictions would
become effective and allowed individuals who previously had
permission to enter the United States to continue to do so.100 But this
revised travel ban did not fare much better in the courts than its
predecessor, with multiple district courts enjoining the enforcement of
the executive order the day before it became effective.101
Although the Supreme Court granted partial enforceability of the
second executive order, it was apparent to the Trump administration
that something had to change if the travel ban were to withstand
judicial scrutiny.102 The final version of the ban was issued via
presidential proclamation on September 27, 2017, with two significant
alterations.103 First, the new proclamation added two new, non-Muslimmajority nations—North Korea and Venezuela—to the restricted
list.104 Second, the proclamation was watered down to primarily cover
visa restrictions.105
The State of Hawaii, along with fifteen other states, challenged the
final version of the ban in federal court.106 The District Court for the
District of Hawaii granted Hawaii’s request for a temporary restraining
order, holding that Trump’s presidential proclamation “lacks sufficient
findings that the entry of more than 150 million nationals from six
specified countries would be ‘detrimental to the interests of the United
States.’”107 Instead of heading back to the drawing board once more,

99. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).
100. Id.
101. Richard Gonzales, Joel Rose & Merrit Kennedy, Trump Travel Ban Blocked Nationwide
by Federal Judges in Hawaii, Maryland, NPR (Mar. 15, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/15/520171478/trump-travel-ban-faces-court-hearings-by-challengerstoday [https://perma.cc/Q8RP-AZKC].
102. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (2017) (mem.) (staying the nationwide preliminary
injunction against the travel ban until the various lower federal courts had a chance to review
Trump’s executive order); see also Muzaffar Chishti, Sarah Pierce & Laura Plata, In Upholding
Travel Ban, Supreme Court Endorses Presidential Authority While Leaving Door Open for Future
POL’Y
INST.
(June
29,
2018),
Challenges,
MIGRATION
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/upholding-travel-ban-supreme-court-endorses-presidentialauthority-while-leaving-door-open
[https://perma.cc/9ZW7-Q5D8]
(“[T]he
Supreme
Court . . . allowed for partial implementation with respect to foreigners without a bona fide
relationship with a U.S. individual or entity.”).
103. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).
107. Id. at 1145 (quoting Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 774 (9th Cir. 2017)).
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the government appealed the district court’s ruling to the Ninth
Circuit.108
In considering the plaintiff’s request for an injunction, the Ninth
Circuit first evaluated the president’s statutory authority under the
INA.109 The court noted that even though the INA confers broad
power over immigration to the executive branch, that power is still
subject to certain implicit limitations.110 Citing the D.C. Circuit’s
holding in Abourezk v. Reagan,111 the Ninth Circuit held that “the
Executive cannot use general exclusionary powers conferred by
Congress to circumvent a specific INA provision without showing a
threat to public interest, welfare, safety or security that was
independent of the specific provision.”112
Turning to the travel ban, the Ninth Circuit found that the
presidential proclamation exceeded the statutory authorization given
by Congress because it failed to “make a legally sufficient finding that
the entry of the specified individuals would be ‘detrimental to the
interests of the United States.’”113 Although the proclamation’s
purported purpose was to “prevent the entry of terrorists and persons
posing a threat to public safety, as well as to enhance
vetting . . . processes,”114 the Ninth Circuit noted Congress had already
addressed those goals in the INA and created mechanisms—like the
Visa Waiver Program and various vetting procedures—to effectuate
them.115 Because of this conflict, the Ninth Circuit found that the
proclamation ran counter to congressional purpose, and upheld the
restraining order to enjoin it.116
Less than one month later, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.117 Although the arguments presented to the Court covered
the intricate statutory and constitutional challenges to the travel ban,
at least one commentator openly wondered: “Could this be the end of
108. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
109. Id. at 683.
110. See id. at 685 (“Congress has delegated substantial power in this area to the Executive
Branch, but the Executive may not exercise that power in a manner that conflicts with the INA’s
finely reticulated regulatory scheme governing the admission of foreign nationals.”).
111. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
112. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 685.
113. Id. at 673 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)).
114. Id. at 685.
115. Id. at 685–86.
116. Id. at 685, 702.
117. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923
(2018).
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plenary power?”118 Because the plenary power doctrine underpins the
INA’s delegation of authority to the president on various aspects of
immigration policy, many observers viewed the case as a harbinger of
the doctrine’s future.119
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld President Trump’s travel
restrictions in a 5–4 decision.120 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts rejected the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the travel ban
failed to make a sufficient finding that the entry of these immigrants
“would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”121 Chief
Justice Roberts noted that the text of the INA only requires the
president to make a finding that the entry of a certain class of aliens
would be detrimental to the United States.122 With this proclamation,
that seems to be the case: President Trump consulted with several
agencies to make the independent determination that aliens from
particular countries—the ones included in the proclamation itself—
pose a national security risk.123 Based on this assessment, the president
acted directly under the broad powers conferred by the statute and
properly excluded classes of people he believed to be a threat.124
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor sharply criticized the majority’s
broadly deferential approach to the executive branch’s
determination.125 Though Chief Justice Roberts’s logistical narrative
revolved around the various administrative procedures and checks that
went into the travel ban, Justice Sotomayor painted a different picture,
one of animus that began on President Trump’s campaign.126
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor noted that during the campaign
“Trump pledged that, if elected, he would ban Muslims from entering
the United States.”127 In her view, the majority ignored Trump’s

118. Margo Schlanger, Symposium: Could This Be the End of Plenary Power?,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 14, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-endplenary-power [https://perma.cc/F95Z-GKFC].
119. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
120. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
121. Id. at 2407–10.
122. Id. at 2408.
123. See id. (arguing that President Trump fulfilled the INA’s requirements because Trump
“ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single
country’s compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline” before issuing the
proclamation identifying a national security interest).
124. Id. at 2410.
125. Id. at 2440 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2435.
127. Id.
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“problematic statements” in favor of “defer[ing] to the President on
issues related to immigration and national security.”128 Moreover,
although the majority outlined the national security issues that
apparently motivated the proclamation, it failed to articulate how the
wide breadth of this particular policy would achieve those state
interests and justify violating the Establishment Clause.129 Based on
this analysis, she concluded that “even a cursory review of the
Government’s asserted national-security rationale reveals that the
Proclamation is nothing more than a ‘religious gerrymander.’”130
On its surface, Trump v. Hawaii is based on the simple question of
whether the president exceeded his statutory authority under the INA.
But scholarly responses to the Court’s decision focused instead on the
broader concern of judicial deference to executive authority. As
Professor Eugene Volokh highlights in his recap of the case, the legal
principle behind the Court’s decision is the enduring tradition of
plenary power: “The federal government may pick and choose which
foreigners to let into the country . . . even based on factors—political
beliefs, religion, and likely race and sex—that would normally be
unconstitutional.”131 One commentator was more explicit, arguing that
“the outcome of [Trump v. Hawaii] does not turn on the president’s
statutory authority to issue the travel ban under the Immigration and
Nationality Act.”132 Indeed, neither Justice Sotomayor’s nor Justice
Breyer’s dissents paid the INA much thought, instead choosing to focus
on the constitutional issues.133 At the end of the day, the Trump v.
Hawaii Court “proclaimed vast presidential powers at the intersection
of two highly sensitive realms of regulation—national security and the
policing of entry to the nation.”134

128. Id. at 2440.
129. Id. at 2440–42.
130. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535
(1992)).
131. Eugene Volokh, The “Travel Ban” Decision, in One (Non-Snarky) Sentence, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2018, 11:47 AM), https://reason.com/2018/06/26/the-travel-ban-decisionin-one-non-snark [https://perma.cc/7WXV-5S8F].
132. Benjamin Wittes, Reflections on the Travel Ban Case and the Constitutional Status of
Pretext, LAWFARE (July 6, 2018, 8:18 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/reflections-travel-bancase-and-constitutional-status-pretext [https://perma.cc/G8KM-UKGL].
133. Id.
134. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Trump v. Hawaii and the Future of Presidential Power over
Immigration, ACS SUP. CT. REV., 2017–2018, at 161, 164.
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*
*
*
The Trump v. Hawaii decision was not quite the litmus test
prognosticators imagined. Although it remains in line with the Court’s
tradition of stepping back from the president’s immigration actions, it
hardly preserves the plenary power doctrine in amber. And even
though the Court championed presidential authority in this instance,
“[w]hat remains unclear is when in the future the Court will take the
same approach.”135 The uncertainty left in Trump v. Hawaii’s wake is
of particular importance when considering the prescriptive remedies
this Note offers in Part III.136
II. MODERN CRITICISMS OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE
Even though the plenary power doctrine and its principles
continue to be invoked by courts, the doctrine has also seen its fair
share of criticism. This Part delves into two such critiques, evaluating
the arguments for and against deference to the executive branch.
Although this Note does not contend that the plenary power doctrine
should be abolished entirely, understanding these arguments will
better contextualize the safeguards this Note proposes in Part III.
Section A discusses how the government conflates immigration and
national security issues. Section B evaluates whether the judiciary is
capable of reviewing immigration cases.
A. Conflating National Security and Immigration
At its base, the plenary power doctrine rests on a troubling
conflation of national security and immigration issues. Part of what
made decisions like Chae Chan Ping and Knauff so persuasive to legal
contemporaries was the government’s appeal to national security. For
example, in Chae Chan Ping, the Court reasoned that given the
government’s perception of the “impossib[ility] for [the Chinese] to
assimilate,” it was almost certain that “our country would be overrun
by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration.”137 In other words, the Court construed a fear of
immigrant culture as a security risk—one that the government was
justified in taking action against.138
135. First Amendment — Establishment Clause — Judicial Review of Pretext — Trump v.
Hawaii, 132 HARV. L. REV. 327, 327 (2018).
136. See infra Part III.
137. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
138. Hafetz, supra note 29, at 628.
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Such conflation is not simply a historical anachronism. In fact,
over the last century and a half, most discussions on immigration have
at least been facially blended with rhetoric concerning national
security.139 Admittedly, the complexities of immigration have long
touched on several facets of our democracy, from economic production
and resources to “internal security, relations with other states, and the
national identity.”140 But much of the recent entanglement between
immigration and national security began in the post–9/11 era.141 In the
wake of the attacks, it became abundantly clear that some changes had
to be made to the federal government’s security protocols, leading to
the most significant alterations to the U.S. national security
infrastructure “since the start of the Cold War at the end of the
1940s.”142 In effect, the United States conducted a wholesale revision
of its current system, reorganizing its intelligence agencies, instating a
Director of National Intelligence, and creating the DHS and the
National Counterterrorism Center.143 This was more than just a mere
reshuffling of existing parts: it facilitated a wide expansion of the
American security apparatus, whose collective budget swelled to $1.2
trillion annually.144
Some of these security measures specifically addressed
immigration issues. For example, in the two years after 9/11, the
nascent DHS established a special registration program for male Arab
and Muslim immigrants.145 The program “fingerprinted, photographed
and interviewed 85,000 Muslim and Arab noncitizens from November

139. Chacón, supra note 52, at 1834.
140. CHRISTOPHER RUDOLPH, NATIONAL SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION: POLICY
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 2 (2006).
141. See generally Deepa Iyer & Jayesh M. Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation of U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy, 38 HUM. RTS. MAG., Winter 2011, https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol38_2011/human_
rights_winter2011/9-11_transformation_of_us_immigration_law_policy [https://perma.cc/RNJ6AXE2] (discussing the growing emphasis on national security in U.S. immigration law in the
decade after the 9/11 attacks).
142. Bruce Riedel, The World After 9/11 – Part I, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Sept. 6, 2011),
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/world-after-911-part-i [https://perma.cc/YS5T-8S5B].
143. Id.
144. Chris Hellman, Tomgram: Chris Hellman, $1.2 Trillion for National Security,
TOMDISPATCH.COM (Mar. 1, 2011, 10:06 AM), http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175361
[https://perma.cc/8VKR-LGE5].
145. Rachel L. Swarns, Special Registration for Arab Immigrants Will Reportedly Stop, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/22/us/special-registration-for-arabimmigrants-will-reportedly-stop.html [https://perma.cc/GW3H-24MG].
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2002 to May 2003.”146 And Congress played its part as well. For
instance, the oft-criticized Patriot Act expanded the definition of
“terrorist activity,” making it so that the Act’s “terrorism provisions
come up most frequently as the basis for denying relief from
deportation to noncitizens, such as asylum for those who claim to fear
persecution if returned to their native land.”147
To be sure, immigration and national security interests are
somewhat intertwined. However, this is partially due to the vast array
of matters that are included under the national security umbrella. The
DHS, for instance, handles a dizzying number of “topics” on a day-today basis, ranging from cybersecurity and disaster relief to terrorism
and border protection.148 Immigration certainly touches on several of
these issues. For example, the endemic of drug cartels frequently using
the border between the United States and Mexico to funnel weapons
and money has accounted for a sizeable portion of the billions of
dollars that exchange hands every year in the drug trade.149 But overlap
on topics like cross-border contraband does not necessarily mean
immigration impacts other national security concerns to the same
extent.
As an illustrative example, consider terrorism. Over the last
decade and a half, immigrants have committed several terrorist attacks
on U.S. soil.150 But upon closer examination, the links between
terrorism and immigration appear more tenuous. In the years after
9/11, the executive branch moved to detain several hundred
immigrants from the Middle East as a counterterrorism measure.151
However, “[f]ew if any of these aliens actually had ties to terrorism,”

146. Id.
147. Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security After
September 11, and the Future of North American Integration, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1384–85
(2007).
148. Topics, HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/topics [https://perma.cc/C8UM-9KRQ].
149. Ron Nixon & Fernanda Santos, U.S. Appetite for Mexico’s Drugs Fuels Illegal
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/us/politics/usappetite-for-mexicos-drugs-fuels-illegal-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/8CAS-2GZV].
150. See Ben Jacobs, America Since 9/11: Timeline of Attacks Linked to the ‘War on Terror,’
(Dec.
11,
2017,
10:23
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usGUARDIAN
news/2017/nov/01/america-since-911-terrorist-attacks-linked-to-the-war-on-terror [https://
perma.cc/95NT-YYYP] (chronicling significant terrorist attacks since 9/11 and the national
origins of those who committed them).
151. Gregory E. Maggs, The Rehnquist Court’s Noninterference with the Guardians of
National Security, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1122, 1125 (2006).
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and the vast majority of these immigrants would have had no reason
for their arrest other than minor immigration violations.152
Statistics aggregated over the last several decades paint a similar
picture. For example, in 2016, “some 40,000 Americans died in traffic
accidents, . . . twelve times the fatalities from all foreign-born terrorists
since 1975.”153 Furthermore, of the 85,000 Muslims whose identities
were catalogued as a part of the DHS’s registration program, “as well
as tens of thousands screened at airports and border crossings,” only
eleven were found to have any ties to terrorism.154 In fact, 82 percent
of all terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 9/11 were conducted by either
American citizens or permanent residents; “[r]efugees and illegal
immigrants in particular have been involved in very few terrorist
incidents.”155 This is not to suggest that immigration has no bearing on
national security issues like terrorism—but their connection can be
exaggerated.
And when this exaggeration does occur, it can be damaging. For
example, when the DHS’s registration program was challenged on
equal protection and due process grounds in Kandamar v. Gonzales,156
the First Circuit deferred to the government, citing “legitimate
government objectives of monitoring nationals from certain countries
to prevent terrorism.”157 The effect of these expansions, short of
actually leading to thwarted terror plots, was clear: the government

152. Id.
153. Ilya Somin, The Case Against Special Judicial Deference in Immigration National Security
Cases, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2017, 3:58 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2017/10/22/the-case-against-special-judicial-deference-in-immigration-andnational-security-cases [https://perma.cc/BR9J-2JSK].
154. Swarns, supra note 145.
155. Niall McCarthy, Most Terrorists in the U.S. Since 9/11 Have Been American Citizens or
Legal Residents, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:08 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/
2017/01/31/most-terrorists-in-the-u-s-since-911-have-been-american-citizens-or-legal-residentsinfographic [https://perma.cc/DTF4-J4ZT]. Interestingly, the perception that national security
and immigration are intertwined has not spilled over to the public at large. As one report
mentions, although “Americans still worry about their security and . . . high rates of illegal
immigration,” unlike their government “they do not conflate the two.” Gregory Michaelidis &
James M. Lindsay, Opinion, Immigrants and National Security, BROOKINGS (May 13, 2003),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/immigrants-and-national-security [https://perma.cc/6MM8YPEN].
156. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
157. Id. at 73; see also Nitin Goyal, The Plenary Power Shield: National Security and the
L.,
https://www.law.cuny.edu/legalSpecial
Registration
Program,
CUNY
SCH.
writing/forum/immigration-law-essays/goyal
[https://perma.cc/CHM2-7WF2]
(“Because
immigration is assumed to be tied to foreign policy and national security, courts will subject
federal immigration statutes and regulations to only deferential review . . . .”).
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“overvalued security [and] undervalued the rights of immigrants”
while “[p]anic, fear, and anger seized the day.”158
Other national security issues, like crime, are also overly conflated
with immigration. For years, politicians and pundits have espoused the
belief that immigration is a driving force behind national crime rates.159
However, that claim lacks substantive backing. A study in the
American Journal of Public Health found that as the number of
undocumented immigrants in the United States rose between 1990 and
2014, the number of drug and driving-under-the-influence arrests
significantly decreased.160 Similarly, a report by the CATO Institute
using data obtained from the Texas Department of Public Safety
concluded that immigrants are significantly less likely to both commit
and be convicted of crimes in comparison to individuals born in the
United States.161
These two examples suggest that political rhetoric based on
anecdotal incidents, rather than concrete facts, plays a much stronger
role in conflating national security and immigration. This is troubling
because modern conflation of these issues does more than create “a
zero-sum contest between security on the one hand, and the rights and
welfare of immigrants, on the other”162—it also “gives the president the
incentive to characterize many questionable actions as
raising . . . national security concerns.”163 This potentially misleading

158. Johnson & Trujillo, supra note 147, at 1380.
159. See Philip Bump, Tucker Carlson’s Rhetoric on Immigrants and Crime Is Wildly
Misleading, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2018, 5:56 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
politics/wp/2018/08/24/tucker-carlsons-rhetoric-on-immigrants-and-crime-is-wildly-misleading
[https://perma.cc/M2BP-X7LM] (noting that political pundit Tucker Carlson frequently makes
televised statements such as: “there are an awful lot of crimes committed by people here illegally
and by noncitizens more broadly”); Amber Phillips, ‘They Carve You Up with a Knife’: Trump Is
Even More Hyperbolic About Immigration Now Than in 2016, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018, 8:58
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/10/23/trump-is-even-more-hyperbolicabout-immigration-now-than [https://perma.cc/LVB2-KCWX] (“President Trump launched his
long-shot presidential campaign in 2015 by declaring Mexican immigrants were drug dealers,
criminals and rapists.”).
160. Michael T. Light, Ty Miller & Brian C. Kelly, Undocumented Immigration, Drug
Problems, and Driving Under the Influence in the United States, 1990–2014, 107 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1448, 1448–51 (2017).
161. Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants in Texas, CATO INST. (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-4-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V7988HA].
162. Hafetz, supra note 29, at 628.
163. Ingrid Brunk Wuerth & Ganesh Sitaraman, The Perils of National Security
Exceptionalism, TAKE CARE (Apr. 23, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-perils-ofnational-security-exceptionalism [https://perma.cc/BN6S-L7F6].
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characterization becomes even easier to make during times of national
crisis, when the government has wide latitude to consider anything a
national security risk.164 These so-called “state[s] of exception”—
periods in which the heightened threats to the country “create
pressures to depart or seek exceptions from ordinary norms”165—may
therefore aggrandize the executive’s plenary power over areas that
may not be cut-and-dry national security issues.
B. The Courts’ Competence to Evaluate Immigration Issues
Another problem with the plenary power doctrine is that it casts
doubt on the judiciary’s institutional competence to assess immigration
issues. To be sure, the executive branch’s superior competence on
issues of national security is undisputed. As Justice Kennedy noted,
“[u]nlike the President,” most federal judges do not “begin the day
with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our
Nation.”166 In particular, members of the executive branch are
equipped with confidential information and regular access to strategic
and military knowledge.167 Courts, on the other hand, simply do not
have the resources to “assess the executive’s intelligence and security
calculations,” which creates a gap in the decision-making competence
between the two branches.168 For this very reason, courts do not second
guess the executive branch in wartime targeting decisions169 and drone
strikes.170
Similar information asymmetry justifies plenary power in the
immigration context. For example, in Reno v. American-Arab
Discrimination Committee171—a case in which the Supreme Court

164. See supra Part I.
165. Hafetz, supra note 29, at 629.
166. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008).
167. Yishai Schwartz, This Is What It Looks Like When Courts Don’t Trust the Commander
in Chief, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 21, 2017, 11:09 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/21/this-iswhat-it-looks-like-when-courts-dont-trust-the-commander-in-chief
[https://perma.cc/8RPE4MWB].
168. Deeks, supra note 27, at 830.
169. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 846 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“We
begin by noting that the court cannot judge . . . whether the attack was ‘mistaken and not
justified.’” (quoting Complaint at 30, El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d
267 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 01-CV-00731))).
170. See Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Put simply, it is not the
role of the Judiciary to second-guess the determination of the Executive . . . for a particular
military action in the ongoing War on Terror.”).
171. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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considered whether Congress had restricted federal courts’ jurisdiction
over selective-enforcement deportation proceedings172—the Court
noted that even if the executive branch reveals its reasons for deporting
a particular individual, “court[s] would be ill equipped to determine
their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.”173
Courts also keep their distance because of the secretive nature of
national security matters.174 For example, when such sensitive matters
are at issue in civil cases, the executive often invokes the “state secrets
privilege,” a doctrine that stops a court-ordered disclosure of
information that might implicate national security secrets.175 However,
courts have not divorced themselves entirely from national security
issues. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,176 for example, the
Court acknowledged that even though the power to designate a group
as a “terrorist organization” rested with the Secretary of State, groups
that believe they were miscategorized may challenge that designation
at the D.C. Circuit.177 In fact, courts regularly consider cases where the
legislative and executive branches have superior expertise, like
“surveillance, data collection, health care, property rights, and
firearms,” and “decide cases in these fields without granting the
government any special deference.”178
Although the executive branch has significant expertise in the
immigration arena, immigration directives should not be beyond
judicial review, for two reasons. First, immigration cases do not always

172. Id. at 473.
173. Id. at 491.
174. See Somin, supra note 153 (“[C]ourts and commentators sometimes reason that in all
national security cases, courts should defer to the executive branch because the courts lack
expertise in the field of national security . . . .”). But see id. (critiquing this justification as unable
to “withstand logical scrutiny” because courts often have little expertise on matters that they
nonetheless routinely address such as antitrust suits or nuclear-waste disposal).
175. TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41741, THE STATE
SECRETS PRIVILEGE: PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION 1–2 (2011); see also Note, The Military and State
Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immunity for the Executive? 91 YALE L.J.
570, 570–71 (1981) (“The information protected usually relates to military affairs, but has also
included information that concerned peacetime foreign policy and foreign intelligence
activities.”). This argument is familiar territory for so-called national security “exceptionalists” or
those who opine that the executive branch should not have to disclose its reasoning for banning
a certain class of people because that disclosure might include significant confidential information
touching on sensitive national security matters. Wuerth & Sitaraman, supra note 163.
176. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
177. Id. at 9.
178. Somin, supra note 153.
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involve state secrets. Every national security matter is different: “Some
national security decisions need to be shrouded in secrecy, . . . others
do not.”179 Even in cases that do involve sensitive information, federal
courts have multiple procedures to accommodate the government’s
interest in confidentiality without disposing of the lawsuit altogether.
Courts can evaluate the record in camera180 or in chambers outside of
the earshot of the public.181 Some federal courts have even held
bifurcated oral arguments to shield confidential information from the
public182 or released redacted copies of briefings to maintain the
government’s interest in secrecy regarding certain facts.183
Second, courts reviewing executive immigration directives are not
determining whether they are effective policy measures. Nor are they
passing judgment on whether the relevant security interests are valid.
Rather, their responsibility in these cases is deciding whether the policy
contravenes the principles of the Constitution by violating individual
rights—something courts are undoubtedly expert at. Indeed, judges are
highly experienced “in interpreting and enforcing individual liberties”
and perhaps are even “more likely to protect our freedoms than the
elected branches of government.”184
In contrast, although executive officials generally have expertise
on the specific policy rationales animating national security measures,
they “tend not to be particularly sensitive to the importance of civil
liberties.”185 Essentially, where the president or Congress are wellsuited to make policy decisions, it is the courts’ responsibility to
determine whether those policies run afoul of the Constitution’s
various guarantees of individual liberty, including the First
Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses.
Determining whether a policy violates the Constitution is “a familiar

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. For a detailed analysis on the merits and drawbacks of in camera review, see generally
Ronald M. Levin, In Camera Inspections Under the Freedom of Information Act, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 557 (1974).
182. See, e.g., Unopposed Motion Concerning Oral Argument at 1–2, United States v.
Sterling, 724 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-5028) (describing which issues would be heard at a
public oral argument and which would be argued within a sealed courtroom).
183. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, No. 12-5147 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2013) (releasing a redacted
opinion in a Washington, D.C. corruption case).
184. Geoffrey R. Stone, National Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2203, 2209
(2007).
185. Id. at 2208.
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judicial exercise,”186 one that courts should not abandon in the face of
expansive presidential power.
III. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO THE
EXECUTIVE
In light of recent developments in the immigration and plenary
power sphere, this Part proposes safeguards to maintain adequate
checks and balances in immigration cases. At their core, these
safeguards balance the institutional asymmetry between the various
branches of government; specifically, they create a counterweight to
the executive branch in immigration national security cases, rather
than advocate for the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine in
its entirety. This Part recommends two reforms. First, the judicial
branch should implement an articulation requirement on executive
orders seeking to invoke judicial deference. Second, Congress should
designate one circuit to hear all challenges to immigration directives
dealing with national security taken by the executive branch.
A. Developing an Articulation Requirement
The judiciary should impose a three-step articulation requirement
on the executive branch in order to trigger plenary power deference:
(1) the relevant executive order must clearly invoke the executive’s
plenary power; (2) it must specify what the national security concern
is; and (3) it must explicitly draw the link between the contents of the
executive order and the national security issue identified. The closest
analogue to this would be clear statement rules. Such rules are used by
courts as a “clarity tax” on the political branches of government to
“legislate exceptionally clearly when [they] wish[] to achieve a
statutory outcome that threatens to intrude upon some judicially
identified constitutional value.”187 Because they “supplement
traditional Marbury-style judicial review,” clear statement rules have
become a popular tool to add some kind of check on the political
branches of government without eliminating any discretion.188 For
example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,189 a case considering the ability to
preempt states on issues of state law, the Supreme Court imposed a
186. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012).
187. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
399 (2010).
188. Id.
189. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 452 (1991).
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clear statement rule on Congress: when it intends to preempt
traditional state functions, Congress must make its desire to do so
unmistakably clear in the text of its statute.190
However, this Note proposes a requirement that goes slightly
beyond typical clear statement rules: rather than merely requiring the
president to demonstrate that she intends to invoke deference to
immigration directives under the plenary power doctrine, the president
should also describe why her action is necessary as a matter of national
security. Admittedly, this exceeds what is typically demanded of actors
by clear statement rules. But this added hurdle is necessary when it
comes to the plenary power doctrine. Unlike other uses of the clear
statement rule—such as when Congress wishes to preempt traditional
state functions or when state courts claim that their judgments are
based on “independent and adequate state grounds”—the president’s
underlying rationale directly affects whether deference should be
granted in the first place.
One of the major concerns of the plenary power doctrine’s
opponents is that it gives a “carte blanche” to the executive branch.191
Accordingly, to provide an additional buffer on unchecked executive
action, the judiciary should implement an articulation requirement to
confirm the link between the national security interests at stake and
the action itself.
Practically, this articulation requirement could be imposed by
either Congress or the federal courts. Although Congress would likely
possess the requisite authority to do so under the plenary power
doctrine, it might be less efficient than a judicial decision; however, the
federal courts are also limited in that they would need a justiciable case
or controversy before them to implement such a rule. Regardless, these

190. Id. at 460. Clear statement rules are not the only mechanism to limit deference by
rulemaking bodies. For instance, agencies are typically entitled to judicial deference of reasonable
interpretations of their organic statutes under Chevron. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). However, courts have created the “major questions
doctrine” to pull back such authority when Congress has seemingly delegated “a policy decision
of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative agency.” See FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (establishing what has been called the “major
questions doctrine,” although never explicitly referring to it by this name). This is because courts
find it “unlikely that Congress would have implicitly delegated the authority to resolve that
question to the relevant agency.” VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., LSB10204, DEFERENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS: WILL THE SUPREME COURT OVERRULE
CHEVRON? 3 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW5N-MZMP]
(emphasis added).
191. Fields, supra note 23, at 732.
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institutional actors would put the onus on the president to present both
the national security concern at risk and how this particular measure
would remedy that concern. Ostensibly, this could offset the blanket
power conferred to the president on immigration matters without
threatening the deference given to the executive branch’s expertise on
matters of national security.
The key difference between an articulation requirement and
proposals offered by others is the role of the courts. For example,
Professor Shawn Fields suggests that rather than granting blanket
deference to the executive branch, “courts should carefully examine
the record” to evaluate whether the president’s immigration order
actually had a nexus to national security “or merely served as a pretext
for a potentially more nefarious and less justifiable reason.”192 Other
scholars, like Professor Nitin Goyal, have proposed similar systems,
where as a threshold matter before granting deference, “the court
should provide more searching judicial review” to determine whether
the executive branch was truly attempting to achieve a “national
security or foreign policy objective[].”193 In contrast, this Note proposes
that the court should not perform its own investigation; rather, the onus
is on the president to draw the connection because the national security
issue would necessarily appear on the face of the executive order.
This proposal might be subject to two primary critiques. First, one
might be concerned that this would allow the judiciary to expose
sensitive national security matters. But as this Note mentioned earlier,
courts can address this concern by reviewing the cases in camera,
redacting sensitive material from the published opinion, or placing the
case under seal.194 Moreover, the president would not necessarily be
required to place sensitive or confidential material pertaining to the
nation’s safety on the face of the executive order; the requirement here
only mandates that the president draw a logical connection between
the immigration order and the national security threat, which can be
done without disclosing sensitive details.
Second, it is also possible to argue that because the articulation
requirement does not involve the judiciary undertaking its own
independent review, the proposal lacks any teeth. But the importance
of some kind of judicial involvement serving as a buffer on previously
unchecked executive action cannot be overstated. In her article The
192. Id. at 766.
193. Goyal, supra note 157.
194. See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
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Observer Effect, Professor Ashley Deeks compares judicial
involvement in national security matters to particle physics, arguing
that just as particles will react differently when they are being
observed, “[w]hen the executive faces a credible threat of litigation,” it
will adjust the contested policy “in ways that render [the policy] more
rights protective.”195 President Trump’s travel ban is a recent analogous
example: the first version of the ban was fairly restrictive, but after
federal courts indicated their intent to uphold the challenge to the ban,
Trump significantly altered its scope in subsequent versions to make it
more judicially palatable.196
Any judicial involvement needs to strike a fine balance. Too much
judicial scrutiny, and courts will ignite fears that they are too involved
in a process traditionally reserved for the political branches of
government; too little, and the executive branch will retain its
unchecked authority over an increasingly controversial area of law.
The articulation requirement proposed by this Note lands in the
narrow middle ground. The executive branch will act differently if
another entity—the judiciary—is in the picture. However, this
requirement does not give the judiciary license to make political
decisions; rather, it would only influence these decisions through an
“observer effect.” In this way, the articulation requirement installs an
additional buffer on executive action while simultaneously avoiding
separation of powers concerns.
B. Designating a Circuit for Plenary Power Policy Challenges
The second step that Congress should take is an affirmative grant
of jurisdiction: it should designate one circuit to exclusively hear
appeals on executive immigration actions that override constitutional
rights in favor of national security. In 2002, a similar, albeit
unintentional, arrangement materialized when the Second and Ninth
Circuits heard a disproportionate amount of the nation’s immigration
appeals.197 However, these circuits were “taken by surprise” by the

195. Deeks, supra note 27, at 830.
196. See supra Part I.C.
197. See Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113–14, 1122–24 (2011)
(explaining that the Second and Ninth Circuits were especially affected by the Department of
Justice’s efforts to expedite immigration appeals because the “Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit contain the locations where roughly three-quarters of the foreign nationals whose cases
constituted the surge were initially processed by an immigration judge”).
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swelling caseloads,198 in part because of a substantial number of judicial
vacancies in the Second Circuit.199
Instead, this Note proposes that executive immigration actions
that are part of specific, wide-sweeping policies with national security
justifications that infringe on constitutional rights be appealed to one
circuit in particular. These appeals would be limited to cases about
executive action, or where the president or executive branch has issued
a particular immigration directive pertaining to national security. So,
for example, if the president were to issue a broad executive order
restricting immigration for all Russian citizens in light of growing
national security concerns and individuals or groups with adequate
standing wanted to challenge the order, they would appeal specifically
to the circuit designated to handle these cases.
The designated-circuit approach would be effective for several
reasons. First, selecting one circuit will help judges in that circuit
develop an expertise in immigration directives, similar to how the
Federal Circuit has emerged as an expert in the fields of patent and
intellectual property law. This would allay concerns about a lack of
judicial competence noted above.200 Second, concentrating these cases
in one circuit enhances efficiency and certainty by letting the body of
law in this area develop in only one place. Finally, a designated circuit
will help dispel fears around cases involving state secrets,201 as courts in
a designated circuit can adopt their own policies to seal cases or take
them in camera if they are the only ones handling those cases. For
example, the D.C. Circuit has its own INA confidentiality mechanisms
when it reviews terrorist-group designations.202
Moreover, Congress has already adopted the designated-circuit
approach for several legal-practice areas. For instance, Congress grants
the D.C. Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over most administrative law
cases;203 the Federal Circuit decides all patent appeals in the United
198. Id. at 1115; see also id. at 1125 (noting how Judge Dorothy Nelson of the Ninth Circuit
said: “It’s just extraordinary. I’ve been on the court for 25 years, but I’ve never seen a
rush . . . overwhelming us like this.”).
199. See id. at 1115 (describing the “judicial emergency” in the Second Circuit a few years
prior to the surge of immigration appeals, “when the departures of judges and political gridlock
in filling vacancies had left five out of the thirteen seats vacant”).
200. See supra Part II.B.
201. See supra Part II.B.
202. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1551).
203. Eric M. Fraser, David K. Kessler, Matthew J.B. Lawrence & Stephen A. Calhoun, The
Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 131, 143 (2013).
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States;204 and a disproportionate number of asylum cases are appealed
to the Ninth Circuit.205 Further research could explore which circuit
would be best suited in terms of both expertise and ability. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, has a considerable amount of experience with
immigration cases while not being burdened with other additional
responsibilities, potentially making it an ideal candidate for this
proposal.
One potential drawback is logistical: How will these courts
manage increasing caseload pressures as a result of these challenges
being concentrated in a single circuit? After all, as mentioned before,
the Second and Ninth Circuits could hardly manage their own dockets
after Board of Immigration Appeals cases were directed to them.206 But
unlike those instances, the circuit designation proposed by this Note
would not allow every immigration-related case to be directed toward
this circuit; rather, only those challenges to broad immigration-policy
directives taken by the executive branch would qualify. That would
necessarily mean that this reform would not extend to individual
immigration appeals, which are already overseen by the Board of
Immigration Appeals and various federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Unlike many, Ellen Knauff’s journey did not end at the border.
She continued to challenge the Supreme Court’s decision to the
Immigration Board, and after a three-year-long battle with various
agencies, she earned entry to the United States.207 Yet even after
Ellen’s individual release and eventual triumph, the Supreme Court
decision justifying her detention remains good law—after all, Chief
Justice Roberts cited the Knauff decision in his majority opinion in
Trump v. Hawaii.208

204. See Emmette F. Hale, III, The “Arising Under” Jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit: An
Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 229, 229 (1986) (“The Federal
Circuit possesses . . . exclusive jurisdiction over all patent appeals.”).
205. BARRY FRIEDMAN, MARGARET H. LEMOS, ANDREW D. MARTIN, TOM S. CLARK,
ALLISON ORR LARSEN, & ANNA HARVEY, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING (forthcoming 2020)
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Not ten years earlier, Justice Kennedy declared that “[l]iberty and
security can be reconciled; and in our system they are reconciled within
the framework of the law.”209 But Justice Kennedy’s words ring hollow
at a time when one branch’s immigration actions—which have
consistently placed individual liberties on the chopping block—are
insulated from any meaningful review. Deference is a powerful tool for
judicial practicality, but it should not be a blank check for one branch
of government to curb individual liberties in the name of national
security.

209. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008).

